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Introduction
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), is a curious subject,
most people in the U.S. know that something called NAFTA exists, yet their
knowledge of what this agreement is very fuzzy at best. There is an understanding
that this treaty has something to with the economy and it could possibly have some
type of impact on them. The treaty is among the three North American countries, and
its designed to “Strengthen the special bonds of friendship”, as the preamble of this
agreement states. But what type of impact will be the result of NAFTA? Who will
benefit?
In order to fully understand the economic impact of NAFTA, I will first explain
the free trade agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. I will then
provide a brief history of Mexico’s economic environment during the 20th century, and
some of the reasons why it decided to enter i nto a free trade agreement
In this paper I will argue that NAFTA is exacerbating the economic disparities
between Northern and Southern Mexico, yet the disparity is not just dependent on
regional economic production, but the fact that Southern Mexico’s location and terrain
characteristics account for some of the reasons why that region has received limited
government resources. I will also discuss how dominant economic interpretations
have lead to a lack of Democracy in the decision making process, and how this has
been to the detriment to Mexican economic development.
In this paper I will focus on the USA-Mexico aspects of NAFTA, for I have a
limited space in which to specifically explain USA-Canadian economic integration. I
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have also realized that there has been little empirical work on Canadian trade and
economic policy that has been a result of NAFTA. I can only guess it is because of a
long history of Canada-USA economic ties, and century long pull of Canadian
industry by The United States (Hanson 2001). Prior
to NAFTA, in 1989, The United States and Canada
entered into the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade
agreement (CFTA), which acted as a precursor and had already laid down the type of
economic policy Canada and the United States would follow as a result to the treaty.
By the time the NAFTA negotiations began, the United States and Canada had three
years of bilateral free trade experience, and therefore would use NAFTA as a way to
simply improve on the CFTA (Grayson 105).

Free Trade: an explanation of NAFTA
Free trade is short for the economic, as well as international, concept of trade
liberalization. Trade liberalization is the reduction in the amount of protectionism in
the world and to practice freer international trade (Arnold 398). This is done by
reducing tariffs, eliminating adverse trading conditions, such as import quotas, and
encouraging friendly monetary policy between countries.
During the first half of the 20th century, nations chose to protect their territory
from outside influences in many ways; this included military buildup, isolationist
actions, and economic protectionist policies. This protectionist ideology was the
direct result of two world wars, the devastating affects of the Great Depression, and
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the cold war standoff between the United States and Russia. As a result of these
crises, the protectionist model became an attractive solution for emerging countries
to withstand the influence of emerging superpowers vying for position in the world
(Orne 59).
The United States also had protectionist sentiments manifest themselves
during the first half of the 20th century. Perhaps the most
poignant example of this type of sentiment was the inability
of President Woodrow Wilson, in 1919, to gain
congressional support for the e ntry of the United States
into the League of Nations, one of the outstanding provisions of the Treaty of
Versailles. This was due in large part of the postwar impulse to withdraw. As
Grayson explains, “ The impulse to retreat from world affairs has been especially
strong at the end of wars, hot and cold, in the 20th century (11). Citing such human
and economic sacrifices: Americans seeing their young people maimed and killed,
paying higher taxes, the enduring of rationing, and restrictions on personal freedoms,
resulted in the eventual weariness of the American people to want to shoulder any
more international burdens.
Economically the protectionist sentiment was manifested in the Smoot-Hawley
tariff of 1930, which brought the U.S. tariff to the highest protective level in the history
of the United States (Orne 121). The Hawley-Smoot Act was intended to protect U.S.
agricultural and industrial industries from foreign competition by increasing the import
fee, or tariff, on foreign goods entering the U.S. The initial results were very
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favorable for U.S. industries, for increasing the import fee for foreign goods would
make U.S. products inexpensive for the U.S. consumer compared to expensive
foreign products (Gale 241). As a result of this American protectionist act, countries
retaliated with their own high tariff acts, which diminished U.S. foreign trade to those
countries. Some would say Smoot-Hawley intensified the economic depression of the
1930’s.
Mexico, from the twenties to the mid eighties, also undertook a protectionist
stance with its economy culminating in Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). This
ideology which drove Mexico’s economic development in the mid-20th century, was
also a concept widely accepted throughout the hemisphere in the 1930s (Grayson
30). In essence, ISI erected protectionist barriers to foster domestic industries that
could produce goods previously purchased from abroad (ibid). Mexican leaders used
ISI as means of reducing dependence on traditional suppliers of food products,
clothing, and consumer durables as automobiles and household appliances. ISI
would also generate employment for a restive and expanding Mexican work force,
and diversify the array of potential exports (ibid). Some examples of Mexico’s
protectionist results of ISI are: The nationalizing of Mexican industries, Land reform
acts, the implementation of tariff “walls”, import licenses, and finally the
implementation of specific monetary policy with regard to the value of the Peso
(Cameron 226, Grayson 46, Hanson 2001,Morales).
Trade liberalization lowers such protectionist barriers and is intended to
facilitate commerce among participating nations in order to enhance economic
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development, create jobs, and remain competitive in global markets by integrating
national economies. In North America, trade liberalization has manifested itself in the
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
NAFTA attempts to integrate the economies of Canada, the United States, and
Mexico, by fostering the elimination of tariffs, creating dispute resolution councils, and
in the case of Mexico, allowing for more investment opportunities in previously closed
industries.
As stated earlier, Mexico truly adopted an economic protectionist policy, and
became one of the leading examples of Latin American protectionism in the mid 20th
century, yet the changing global economic climate of the eighties resulted in Mexico’s
reassessment of ISI policies. Dependency was never eliminated it simply changed
form. In order for Mexican industries to develop, the Mexican government found
themselves increasingly dependent on machine tools and other technological
advances that would nurture their infant industries. Because of adverse terms of
trade, manufacturers in industrialized nations would have to charge higher prices for
the technology needed by Mexican industries. In essence, more Mexican
commodities, such as coffee or sugar, would be needed to purchase a tractor,
generator, or machine tool (Grayson 34). Another reason why Mexico did away with
ISI was the poor efficiency Mexican industries developed because of lack of
competition. Products of protected Mexican industries were increasingly cheap in
quality, and expensive in price. Finally, the opportunity for corruption increased
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dramatically as administrators and politicians doling out ISI funds, would extract
bribes and political favors of the funds recipients (Cameron 226, Grayson 35).
During Mexico’s protectionist ISI days, one of the driving forces of the inward
looking economy was petroleum. In the 1970’s as the world experienced an oil
crises, Mexico was in a position to capitalize on the growing energy shortage. Yet
wealth never materialized, for the government was trapped in a cycle of excessive
spending, which in turn drove prices higher. The result was the need for Mexico to
become dependent on loans from international organizations and countries. As
Grayson explains, “Like a heroin addict who sells his blood in the morning to get a
‘fix’ from an eager, well-heeled supplier at night, Mexico reacted to petrolization
pressures by exchanging oil for loans (38). This policy of petrolization, proved to be
a detriment for the oil crises would eventually end and bringing the price of oil down
in 1982 and 1986, and at the same time global interest rates began to rise. This
resulted in Mexico’s inability to meet its debt obligations (Cameron 226).

Trade liberalization was chosen as the remedy for
Mexico’s economic problems. Beginning with the
Presidency of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (19821988), Mexico undertook a market-oriented direction
in its economic policy that resulted in Mexico joining the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986. GATT is a Geneva-based, multination
organization devoted to promoting trade by lowering barriers and conferring
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reciprocal benefits on its members. The ensuing President, Carlos Salinas de Gortari
(1988-1994) quickened the pace of Mexican economic liberalization, which
culminated with the signing of NAFTA (Cameron 57, Grayson 44, Hanson 1998,
Hanson 2001).
NAFTA would ideally improve the terms of trade with Mexico, and allow for the
diffusion of technology to Mexican industries without entailing the high costs that has
been previously mentioned. NAFTA is by no means the beginning of trade
liberalization between the United States and Mexico, for there were already forces
dictating the direction of economic policy between the two countries.

Economic Integration: NAFTA and
Regionalism.
Mexico’s decision to enter into a trade agreement
with the U.S. and Canada was the result of policy
directed at liberalizing the Mexican economy. For
many of the reasons previously mentioned, yet
regional economic integration was already happening between the two
countries. NAFTA simply finalizes a regional process that had been under
way for nearly a decade before the treaty was signed (Cremeans 31).
Regionalism as it pertains to NAFTA is not necessarily globalization. Globalization is
the increase of in the magnitude of international transactions, be they economic,

Antonio Arellano
Professor Fotsch
HCOM Capstone
26 April 2002

Arellano 11

technological, communication, or cultural, on a truly global scale (Biersteker,
Morales). This process has usually been identified with large multinational or trans
national corporations, seeking to position themselves strategically to take full
advantage of the benefits of a global economy.
Regionalism is similar to Globalization in the sense that the same idea applies
on a regional level, and in a process that is specific to the identified region. As Boas
and Marchand explain, “Regionalism concerns the ideas, identities and ideologies
related to a certain region. As such, regionalism is clearly a political project, but it is
obviously not necessarily state-led, as states are not the only political actors around”.
Attempts to regionalize have been strongly supported Trans National Corporations
(TNC’s), who wish to establish themselves in newly opened economies as a result of
trade liberalization (Dicken)
A few examples of the regional integration projects include: The association
for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), The European
Union (EU), a number of the South American Nations (MERCOSUR), and the
Southern African Development Community (SADC).
Regionalism is
much more than
process of material
flows of production,
technological of
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financial resources. Ideas, ideologies, and identities also become regional (Boas).
The lowering of trade barriers and increased flow of goods and services between
participating nation states also allow for a flow of ideas, yet it also allows for informal
institutions to also become regional. Understanding that economic integration on a
regional level facilitates the regional-isation of “illegal” activities. Trade liberalization
when negotiated and implemented toward a vision of economic interdependence
allows for the regional-ization of gun-running, drug-trafficking, criminal networks, and
terrorist cells (Boas).
The bringing down of walls that limited the movement and reach of people,
has resulted in the emergence of “super-empowered individuals” (Friedman). As he
explains, “the world is wired into networks…which gives individuals more power to
influence markets and nation states”. This influence is the result of the ability of the
super-empowered actor to recognize and exploit the inability of states to cooperate
and maintain control of transnational technological, financial, commercial, and
migratory flows (Earnest). A well-known example of this type of empowerment is
Osama Bin Laden with his own global network, that permitted him to declare war on
the United States, and now the United State is involved in a “War on Terrorism”. The
air force is launching cruise missiles at him as though he were a nation state
(Friedman).
The regional similarities as well as challenges between the U.S. and Mexico
are evident in the South West and Southern areas of the United States they are
especially evident at the border of Mexico and the United States. In this sense
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regionalism takes on the concept of relative convergence of dimensions such as
cultural affinity, political regimes, security arrangements and economic policies (i.e.
relative sameness) (Boas, Marchand). The border region between the United States
and Mexico that runs from San Diego-Tijuana to Matamoros-Brownsville, known as
Mexamerica is perhaps the epitome of this convergence and the types of challenges
that economic integration produces.
The beginning of economic integration for The U.S. and Mexico began in
1965, when the Mexican government allowed foreign companies (primarily U.S.
firms) to build assembly plants along the border region, most commonly known as
Maquiladoras. These Maquiladoras were required to export all output and locate in
specially designated zones in the Mexican cities. By 1972, maquiladoras were
allowed to locate in most regions of the country and by 1988 they were allowed to sell
a portion of their goods on the domestic market. Nevertheless, the plants continue to
be concentrated in border cities and export virtually all production (Hanson II,
Morales).

As a result U.S. firms began to move assembly operations to Mexican

border cities, to take advantage of the comparatively lower wages in Mexico as
opposed to the higher wages in the United States. The result is, the agglomeration
of production industry toward the Mexican border (Hanson 2001).
But the change in Mexican border policy wasn’t the only reason for this move
on the part of American industry to the border. The U.S., in the 50’s and 60’s, was
seeing a population shift toward the Southwest. During World War II, California
witnessed a figurative explosion in military maritime production, and witnessed a shift
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in boatyard workers. Factors such as the development of the interstate highway
system and the advent of air conditioning had very much to do with regional
population changes in the U.S. (ibid).
The most infamous effects of an informal institution becoming regional along
with legitimate projects is the proliferation of the drug trade. An interesting example
of the way drug cartels have adapted to the new regional scheme is the ArellanoFelix organization of Tijuana. Their success has been the result of organizational
emulation of Transnational Corporations that have become regional. These
corporations have strategically placed people in key positions where they are
somehow involved. The Arellano’s have done the same by forging relationships with
the people who produce the product in Colombia, to the officials of all the
governments the drugs might pass through, and finally by establishing a modern
distribution system in the United States (Padgett). Perhaps one of the main reasons
they as well as other drug cartels continue to remain successful is their ability to
effectively coordinate efforts in all areas that affect their success. Conversely this is
the same reason U.S. drug enforcement efforts have been rather limited, for U.S.
agencies face severe difficulties, and sovereignty issues, when attempting to initiate
investigative operations in those same areas where the cartels have interests
(Earnest).
The U.S. and Mexico share such a long border. It is understandable the interregion transactions concerning money, ideas, and people will continue to increase as
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economic integration takes place. Creating a new type of relationship between The
United States and Mexico.
Economic integration of the Mexican and U.S. economies will prompt different
outcomes of decisions pertaining to sovereignty. No longer will these issues solely
be in the realm of state sovereignty but they have and will continue to take on a new
dimension as economic integration leads directly to economic Interdependence.

Challenges of NAFTA: Regional Reorganization
The opening of both economies as a result of NAFTA, has not witnessed the
even distribution of economic benefit, but instead integration has proceeded between
key territories between the two countries (Hanson 2001, Morales). The two main
U.S. territories that have seen the greatest increase in exports due to NAFTA has
been the “Southern NAFTA states” which consist of Arizona, California, Texas, and
Florida, and “Center North NAFTA states” which consist of Illinois, Indiana, and
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Michigan. The southern NAFTA states account for 53% of all U.S. exports to Mexico,
and the center north NAFTA states account for 19% of all U.S. exports to Mexico.
These combined U.S. regions account for 72% of all U.S. exports to Mexico. It is
interesting to note that among the Southern NAFTA states, the states that border
Mexico: Arizona, California, and Texas account for 32% of all U.S. exports to Mexico
which point to U.S. industrial agglomeration toward the border (Hanson 2001,Miser
1997,Morales).
On the Mexican side the reorganization of
industries toward certain regions has resulted in the
formation of five key manufacturing sectors. They are:
Mexamerica, The Northern high tech-region, the Green
sector, the Central High-tech core, and the Oil and
Chemical strip.
Mexamerica is the border region of Mexico and the United States. The
corridor runs from the San Diego/Tijuana on the Pacific Ocean, to
Matamoros/Brownsville on the Gulf of Mexico. In 1997 24 million people lived within
this area and witnessed a population growth well above their respective national
averages, 3.1% on the U.S. side of Mexamerica, and 4% for the Mexican side (U.S.
Census, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica). It is worth noting that most maquiladora
operations of U.S. corporations are located on the Mexican side of the border region.
The northern high-tech region encompasses the northern most Mexican states
that border the U.S., yet not including Mexamerica. They are the states of Baja
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California across to the Gulf of Mexico state of Tamaulipas. This region dominates
Mexican exports and output in transport, machinery and equipment, and primary and
fabricated metals at 23%, 28%, and 28% respectively. This region is at 66% above
the national average, and in terms of aggregated income it is the wealthiest region in
Mexico. NAFTA’s biggest supporters were from this region (Morales).
The green sector region is compromised of the Mexican states just below the
northern high-region.

This region can be broken down into two sub regions. The

first will be referred to as the northwest zone. This region is comprised of the Mexican
states Sonora, Chihuahua, and Sinaloa. The best way to describe this region is as
dynamic agri-business which is highly competitive with U.S. agricultural firms. The
second sub region of the green sector is the southeast zone. The Mexican states in
this part are: Durango, Nayarit, and Zacatecas. This region is poor, and it has low
agricultural productivity.
The central high-tech core is comprised of the Mexican states that are in
Mexico’s central plateau. This is still considered the core of Mexico’s manufacturing
activities. The city of Mexico has a per capita income of 158% above the national
average (Hanson 1998).
The oil and chemical strip is compromised of parts of Tabasco, Chiapas, and
the state of Campeche. The state of Campeche is the wealthiest in Mexico with a per
capita income of 132% above the national average.
This type of regional economic re-organization toward border regions in both
countries has manifested itself in the growth of border-city pairs. The border city
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pairs are the twin cities that are along Mexamerica. On the Pacific coast there is the
twin cities of San Diego/Tijuana, and on the Gulf of Mexico the twin harbors of
Matamoros/Brownsville are the eastern border-city pair.
The most serious challenge NAFTA has brought to the issue of regional
economic integration was the Mexican Peso crisis of 1994. President Salinas de
Gortari’s desire to make the Mexican economy appear better than what it actually
was, resulted in the currency crises. His decision was an attempt to hide Mexican
economic shortcomings so that the U.S. and Canada would be more willing to enter
into NAFTA (Cameron 226, Flores, Menocal). He did this by in effect allowing the
Mexican Peso to become overvalued.
I will not go into specific details on how the Mexican government allowed their
currency, the peso, to become overvalued and the myriad of reasons why it was
forced to devalue it. President Gortari used specific macroeconomic policy to over
value the Mexican peso, with a strong currency U.S. goods and services became
much cheaper for the Mexican consumer. The result was a temporary influx of
American made products into Mexico, and this gave U.S. exporting firms a very
favorable business climate in Mexico.
The problem with such market-oriented policy is it would eventually cause a
significant increase in inflation, and a persistent increase in the general price level as
a result. Lowering real Mexican purchasing power (Humphrey). This was very much
a quick fix for the Mexican economy, for the initial boost in Mexican import spending
would become the same reason for increased inflation and subsequently the inability
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of Mexican consumer to continue to buy American goods. As the price increased the
Mexican people would simply not be able to afford them.
A strong stable Peso, perhaps even overvalued, was felt by the Mexican
leadership at the time to be an important ingredient to the immediate economic
success of Mexico. A strong Peso was a pivotal feature when Mexico decided to
issue tesebonos, that were guaranteed to be repaid in U.S. dollars. Tesebonos are
Mexican government short-term bonds that were used to raise revenue and begin to
payback its national debt. With a favorable currency, and a guarantee to payback in
U.S. dollars, investors in essence swallowed them up (ibid).
Mexico came to rely heavily on these investments, but as stated earlier the
strong peso did spur domestic economic growth and a growth in domestic
employment. Mexico did become a victim of its own success. Likening the situation
to that of an American consumer that has too many bills and not enough money, the
consumer may choose to pay the bills with a credit card. The problem is that the
consumer is thereby not actually reducing his/her debt, but merely deferring it and
generating a new bill (Humphrey).
The decision to devalue the peso was the result of the Mexican government’s
inability to repay its foreign debt. The more investment it received, the more it
needed to continue its policy of keeping a strong Peso. The Mexican government
was indeed “painted into a corner” with its currency policy, either it defaulted on its
loan and receive an unfavorable credit rating, or devalue the Peso and risk seeing all
its FDI, leave the country (ibid).
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The Mexican government kept the world guessing in regards to its policy on
the Peso, for a few weeks before the devaluation Jaime Serra Puche, a key Mexican
financial who was involved in the NAFTA negotiations, told the Wall street Journal
that Mexico would not devalue it currency. Then in a surprise announcement in
December 1994, President Ernesto Zedillo announced the devaluation, which led
investors to withdraw almost all their investments. Mexico was left in a state of
economic disarray that was witnessing its foreign investment leaving while at the
same its peso was becoming worthless.
For the United States this posed an interesting economic dilemma. How
would a financial crisis in Mexico, a country that shared a 2000-mile border with the
U.S. and a Treaty to liberalize trade, be perceived. Would the U.S. feel compelled to
help Mexico? The answer is Yes.
Bailing out Mexico of its financial crises was perceived as a prudent course of
action for the Clinton administration, for the fear that an unstable economy south of
the border would result in severe financial, social, and immigration ramifications.
Financial in the sense that there was the possibility that an economic crisis in Mexico
could spill over into the U.S., and also if the peso became worth less it would flood
the U.S. markets with low-priced Mexican goods. The reduction of trade barriers
because of NAFTA would have facilitated that possibility.
The social consequences of not helping Mexico would have resulted in a
dramatic increase in the trafficking of illegal drugs across the border. More Mexicans
with far less possibilities would turn to illegal activities to try and survive.
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The issue of immigration, has always been a topic of heated debates in the
U.S. and for much of the same reasons some Mexicans would turn to illegal
activities, they would also turn to trying to cross the U.S./Mexico border illegally.
As a result the U.S. formulated a bailout package that received harsh criticism
from liberal as well as conservative representative in Congress. With the eventual
result being legislation that attached obligations onto the money that Mexico received
(ibid).

Economic Geography
The NAFTA vision was a free trade area that stretched from the Yukon to the
Yucatan, in which economic benefits would be bestowed upon on the participating
countries with social conditions improving as a direct result of the treaty. Trade
liberalization as a concept to reduce barriers to commerce between participating
countries, has not served economically challenged areas within the NAFTA zone.
Three important reasons why economically challenged areas are not being
served well by NAFTA are: geographical considerations, industry incompatibility, and
economic infrastructure. The example I will use to describe all three of these
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challenges will be the Southern region of Mexico, which includes the states of
Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Guerrero which I will call, “The
Mexican South”.
The “Mexican South” is characterized as a
tropical climate, with jungles, mountains, and dense
vegetation. The two main forms of economic activity in this area is either tourism,
which solely exist along the ocean coast, and agriculture. The area borders Central
America and is mostly populated with indigenous people are different from the rest of
Mexico culturally, linguistically, and even physically. The people don’t not identify
themselves as Mexican rather they affiliate themselves as descendents of the Maya
and choose to use tribal affiliations as a means of identity (EZLN.org, Harvey,).
It is the farthest region from the United States. The hustle and bustle of the
border region between the U.S. and Mexico has no meaning here, for there has been
a miniscule amount of foreign investment
entering into this region (Flores). Even
before NAFTA, the region received little
money for development from Mexico City,
for industry development of ISI was
concentrated in manufacturing belt
surrounding Mexico City (Flores, Hanson, Morales). Prior to economic liberalization,
in Mexico the development of industry was centralized in this area with the peripheral
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regions, the Northern border region and the Southern border region left to develop
slowly and without much help from Mexico City.
For the South, NAFTA had done very little to develop this region and improve
conditions of the people living there. If the premise of policy directed toward trade
liberalization will provide opportunities for increase in exports that will subsequently
create jobs and living conditions, then NAFTA has failed in Southern Mexico.
The southern Mexican region suffers from it lack of proximity to the U.S., for
many of the decisions of U.S. firms wanting to invest in Mexico will be the proximity of
the region to the U.S. A number of reasons compel U.S. firms to want to locate
production and or assembly operations near the U.S., but the most important reason
is transportation costs. Proximity to the U.S., is suc h a benefit to U.S. firms that even
though all of Mexico has been opened up economically, most of the export oriented
production still takes place along the border (Flores). Basically leaving the southern
regions to struggle in this new world economy.
The lack of necessary infrastructure is the main reason for the lack of
necessary FDI in this region. In order for a developing country to successfully enter
into this new world economy, it has to have the necessary infrastructure to handle
these new investments. The necessary infrastructure consists of modern roads that
allow the flow of trucking, ports that are able to load and unload cargo in a speedy
manner, and finally and perhaps most importantly the developing country needs a
population of skilled workers to ready to fill labor as well as administrative positions
created by the new investment (Gallup, Hausmann).
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Southern Mexico has seen very little investment in its economic infrastructure
because of NAFTA, for most of the developmental funds have been diverted to the
northern border region (Castaneda, Flores). Indeed the northern Mexican region is
geographically, industrially, and Culturally better positioned to take full advantage of
NAFTA, while the South is not. It is almost fundamental that Mexico will want to
develop the border area, especially since its main trading partners will be The U.S.
and Canada.
Mexico is not alone when it chooses to divert development funds towards
areas that will benefit from free trade arrangements and in essences ignore areas
that have very little economic growth potential. A majority of the world’s developing
economies have chosen this strategy for entry into the world economy, mainly
because of pressure from industrialized nations, international financial organizations,
and trans national corporations wishing to invest in these developing economies (Kirk
273). As stated earlier trade liberalization is the concept of lowering barriers to trade,
yet in today’s vision of economic integration simply lowering barriers and reducing
tariffs is not enough. In order for developing economies to truly reap the rewards of
regional economic integration, such as FDI, it must adhere to seemingly long list of
requirements that include institutional reforms as well as economic reforms, the same
institutional reforms that took today’s industrialized nations generations to accomplish
(Rodrik).
The idea that economic integration of an economy into the global economy will
provide the necessary investment in development is basically a substitute for a
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development strategy (ibid). Most of the investment needed to spur economic growth
will be directed towards areas of an economy that are already well developed, or
have the potential for expedient development. President Jacques Chirac of France
told reporters at the U.N. summit for economic development in Monterrey Mexico,
“There’s no creation of wealth without the necessary infrastructure - - and that
infrastructure demands outside aid” (Kahn).
In the case of Mexico the border region, which is very well positioned to reap
the benefits of economic integration has seen a substantial increase in investment
and government spending. In a visit I made to the city of Mexicali in August of 1999,
I witnessed construction of roads and sewers in a neighborhood whose streets had
been previously unpaved even though the neighborhood is situated rather close to
the center of downtown Mexicali. Mexicali borders California in the southeastern part
of the state. It has experienced a rapid growth of industry and boom in maquiladora
construction since the passage of NAFTA.
Southern Mexico has lagged socially, culturally, and economically from the
rest of Mexico and the United States and Canada. But its just not the southern
regions that is lagging it is also the working class of Mexico and the U.S. that has
been promised the benefits of trade liberalization, yet those promises in regards to
better wages and working conditions have not materialized.
NAFTA was formulated from a neo-classical, neo-liberal perspective. This
type of economic model basically allows for the functioning of the market system
without much intervention from the state. A neo-classical approach basically says
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that the “invisible hand” of the market will regulate itself, and that self-regulation will
be the result of supply and demand, whether it be in raw materials, labor, or wages.
The neo-liberal part of this theory assumes that lower barriers to trade will inevitably
increase exports, which will in turn result in more jobs for a developing economy, and
an increase of the middle class. The benefits would be an educated population, less
immigration to industrialized nations, less poverty, and more democracy.
Mexican economic policy, in attempting to develop its economy adhered to this
neo-classical/neo-liberal policy. The presidents of Mexico and the U.S. both
assumed that by liberalizing trade, the benefits would exceed the costs, yet what
NAFTA never addressed was the power inequality between the large Transnational
Corporations (TNC’s), and the people of the participating countries who would feel
the ramifications of such economic policy (Grayson, Cameron, Menocal). The
liberalizing of Trade was in effect a liberalization of capital expansion, that served
these TNC’s (Kirk 271). The benefits to the vast majority of people have not been
realized because NAFTA is in part a regional attempt of TNC’s, to, “ rewrite the
framework of international economic relations…placing severe restrictions on the
right of government to regulate the activities of transnational corporations in order to
protect the environment, safeguard labor…and promote the development of their own
economies (Hoffman 102).
From this perspective, the solutions for the developing economy become
technical, and democratic participation no longer becomes important for government
officials and business elites, “will know what’s best”, for the country. President
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Salinas echoed these sentiments when he said, “when you are introducing such
strong economic reform, you must make sure that you build the political consensus
around it. If you are at the same time introducing additional drastic political reform,
you may end up with no reform at all” (New Perspectives Quarterly 1991, 8).
Allowing only the corporations that will be investing into the economy to direct
economic policy leads to results that exacerbates between the wealthy elite, and the
poor working class. NAFTA as it is written is a project aimed at maintaining U.S.
economic superiority in an i ncreasingly global oriented economy (Hoffman 103,
Nader).

Conclusion: More Democracy
The results of NAFTA on both the U.S. and Mexico, have been both good and
bad. Good in the sense that trade between the two countries has increased and the
U.S. has seen a significant increase in its exports to Mexico. The increase in the
amount of Mexican assembly plants along the U.S. border has led to an increase in
production facilities on the U.S. side that supply these assembly plants, for an
increase in export manufacturing in a Mexican border city leads to direct increase,
on a smaller scale, of employment in the neighboring American border city (Hanson
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2001). Mexico has also seen economic benefits as a result of NAFTA. It has seen a
dramatic increase in foreign direct investment, yet 90% of that investment has been
directed toward just nine Mexican states, all of those in the northern region and
especially those bordering the United States (Flores). For Mexico its Northern region
has a significant advantage in contrast with its Southern region. The location of
production has been a toward the North for it has a comparative advantage than the
south, for the North is a region that is more technologically advanced, better
transportation means, and the advantage of being close to the U.S. (Venables).
Economic factors alone cannot solely be considered when assessing the
attempt to integrate the three North American economies. Approaching this issue
from a purely economic perspective doesn’t allow for the understanding that
democratic participation, cultural understanding, and marginalized perspectives in
both countries have been omitted from the process of economic decision making.
Understanding this, I am reminded of a particular song that I enjoy very much.
It is written and performed by a Chilean group called, “Los Prisioneros”. The song is,
“Latinoamerica es un pueblo al sur del EE.UU. (Latin America is simply a group of
people just south of the U.S.). I was introduced to this group and song during a visit
to Colombia in 2000. The song is basically a criticism of the U.S. and its foreign
economic policy concerning Latin America. It is very popular in South America for
the people there feel that their economic well being, is very much dependent on the
United States. Latin Americans feel that their countries have very little autonomy
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when it comes to making major economic decisions, for those economic decision
have to be cleared with the U.S. before they can be implemented.
NAFTA is an example of how dominant discourses have prevailed regarding
economic development and national policy in Mexico. Much of the discussion of
NAFTA, was centered around business opportunities and developing the Mexican
economy, for it was perceived as vital to U.S. economic interests the Mexico become
much more industrialized and export oriented. The liberalizing of trade between the
two countries, the subsequent devaluation of the Mexican peso, and the location of
industry in both countries has been the result of focusing on strictly economic
development. Democratic participation and regional considerations were never
considered to be part of the process, and as a result the working class of both
countries have not seen the benefits of NAFTA materialize.
The interests of big business, or corporations, were allowed to prevail over the
interests of the citizens of both countries. Corporations that have chosen to move
assembly, or manufacturing operations, to Mexico to take advantage of lower wages,
have seen the greatest benefit. At the same time the United States is manufacturing
fewer and fewer products. The result with a lack of manufacturing jobs, the job
market in the United States is becoming increasingly polarized between professional
jobs and low-paying service work (Kirk 266). From this assessment, it is very evident
how the gap between the Rich and the Poor is being proliferated.
In a recent appearance in Portland Oregon, Ralph Nader, addressed this
disparity by saying, “…based on the premise that sharing a nd distributing power and
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giving human beings more rights than the artificial entities called corporations, giving
human beings the popular sovereignty, produces results that are
clearly better for the vast majority of the people and their
descendants” (Debate on political Power).
Economic development doesn’t have to be at the cost of
middle and poor class, and allowing the people who will be
affected by economic policy the opportunity to properly voice
their concerns and ideas is the essence of this paper. NAFTA did not afford people
in either country to effectively participate, or even be make them aware what this
treaty really meant to their countries. This lack of democratic participation will not
benefit the attempt to integrate these two economies, for I am in complete agreement
with Ralph Nader when he states that, “Democracy is good for good business, it is
bad for bad business”.
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Working Title of Capstone Project:
The North American Free Trade Agreement, as an example of regional
economic integration, and the challenges of democracy in developing economic
policy.
Capstone Topic:
This project will be an understanding of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the assumptions concerning the regional economies of
Mexico. I will be researching the time period of 1995-1999. My primary focus is
going to be of regional Mexican economies that are geographically, culturally, and
economically distanced from the United States. I want to investigate any economic
correlations between the working class of those Mexican regions and the working
class of the United States. I want to use this project to better understand cultural as
well as economic interdependence issues of nations that enter into trade treaties,
and possibly to be included into U.S. guidelines concerning trade negotiations and
foreign economic policy.

Major learning Outcomes and Criteria: ) I will be using MLOs 1,2,3. MLO 1,
because I will be looking into the ways dialogue has been practiced between the two
cultures, and discover if communication has been cooperative or adversarial. MLO 2,
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for much of the investigation will involve research skills. MLO 3, I will use skills to
communicate ethically, and to discover how dominant discourses have omitted
beliefs, attitudes, and values of groups of less power in their socio-historical context.
Research Questions:
1) What is NAFTA?
2) Who are the people that stand to benefit from this economic treaty?
3) What are the challenges and dilemmas faced by the working class of
Mexico and the U.S.?
4) How have the working class of both countries meet their specific
challenges, and how similar are their challenges?
5) What are geo-economies?
6) What is current economic foreign policy concerning developing nations and
regions?
7) How have trade negotiations been conducted?
8) Have contradictory discourse concerning economic treaties been
adequately represented?
9) Does NAFTA consider economically challenged regions?
10) What needs to be included in the treaty to allow fairness to people that live
in the countries that have signed this treaty?
11) What can be learned from NAFTA that will be useful in U.S. economic
foreign policy?
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